We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers-typically across-family mergers-benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation.
Introduction
Recent scandals involving US mutual fund companies have elevated concerns among fund regulators and pundits regarding the effectiveness of mutual fund boards the socalled watchdogs of shareholders' interests. To better protect the interests of fund shareholders, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted on June 23, 2004 to require that chairpersons of mutual fund boards be independent of the investment advisory firm affiliated with the fund. In addition, the SEC required that at least 75% of the mutual fund directors be independent.
1 The previous requirement was 50%. The US Chamber of Commerce objected by filing a lawsuit opposing the changes; according to its general counsel, ''There's no empirical evidence that an independent chairman or a 75% majority will have a positive effect on the performance of mutual funds''.
2 Two of the five SEC commissioners also objected, arguing that there was little empirical data to support such drastic changes in fund governance policies.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that addresses whether fund boards with certain structural characteristics perform differently. Examining open-end fund companies from the 50 largest fund complexes, Tufano and Sevick (1997) document that fund fees are smaller for funds overseen by smaller boards and boards with a larger proportion of independent directors. Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003) document similar evidence for closed-end mutual funds. Zitzewitz (2003) finds that the adoption of fair value pricing, which protects investors from market timing, is negatively related to the percentage of insiders on the board, suggestive of agency problems inherent in fund organizations. These studies look at fee setting and pricing policies because regulations empower fund boards to oversee or make such decisions.
In this paper, we examine another fund decision where boards play a critical role: the decision to merge a fund out of existence. Using a cross-section of fund boards in the 1999-2001 period, we examine the relation between mergers and board structure. We motivate this work by examining the consequences of mergers of funds for their shareholders and trustees. We primarily focus on target funds in across-family mergers, i.e., mergers between acquiring and target funds belonging to different fund families, because these mergers typically reflect an organizational restructuring rather than a mere reshuffling of funds within a complex. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that fund mergers-especially across-family fund mergers-tend to be value enhancing for target fund shareholders. However, these mergers are costly for the trustees of these merged funds, who lose board seats and compensation. Given this possible tension between the board's private interests and its fiduciary duties, certain governance traits might enhance a board's willingness to take actions that are personally costly but beneficial for shareholders. Specifically, we study whether boards that are thought to be more independent or effective are more likely to take such actions promptly. We also study whether boards for whom merging is more costly, in terms of a prospective loss in director compensation, are less likely to merge themselves out of a job.
Our work broadly relates to studies that link firm value to governance traits (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) . However, given the unique nature of a fund's organizational structure, many corporate governance devices are not applicable, such as anti-greenmail provisions, poison pills, golden parachutes, cumulative voting, and special supermajority rules. Rather, we focus on governance measures used in the fund industry. Consistent with prior studies, we find that mergers are more likely when the target's performance is poor, the target is small and young, and its expenses are high. What's more, fund mergers-at least across-family mergers-are significantly more likely when the target underperforms and its board is composed primarily of independent directors, a structural characteristic attributed to more independent and effective boards. Boards that are nominally more independent tolerate less underperformance before initiating a merger, relative to other funds with the same investment objective. To the extent that mergers are reactions to poor performance, independent boards are more likely to act, and to act more quickly, to stem shareholder losses from poor performance. The SEC has mandated that boards have 75% independent members, but our results suggest that it is boards composed wholly of independent members that seem to be most vigilant with respect to performance.
Trustees approve across-family mergers even when this leads to a substantial loss of their board compensation, consistent with trustees putting the interests of shareholders before their own. In our multinomial logistic regression analyses, however, we find that mergers are less likely among target funds whose directors are paid more, especially for across-family mergers where trustees are likely to lose their seats and compensation as a result of the merger. In these circumstances, directors' private interests may come into conflict with their fiduciary duties.
We also examine the role of a variety of other board characteristics in explaining the fund merger decision. Specifically, we study the effect of the presence of a retirement and deferred compensation plans, the number of outside directorships held by each independent board member, the prior industry experience of independent board members, and the age of the fund's board. Our results provide little evidence that any of these characteristics affect the likelihood of performance-related fund mergers.
While certain types of boards might initiate performance-related mergers sooner, we find no evidence that board characteristics are related to post-merger performance. Generally, target underperformance is halted but not reversed, regardless of board structure. Once awakened, boards of all types seem to take steps that lead to roughly comparable performance outcomes, i.e., they catch up to the median fund of their type.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on fund mergers, a basic description of the fund merger data, and a discussion of related hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the relation between a fund's governance structure and the propensity to merge. Section 4 offers conclusions.
Institutional background and hypotheses

Institutional background on mutual fund governance and mergers
US mutual fund governance structures are somewhat different in law from what fund shareholders and even scholars might imagine them to be. Unlike financial products offered by financial institutions, such as bank deposits or certificates of deposit, a mutual fund is a corporate entity. Each fund is overseen by a board of directors (or trustees) that hires the service providers, including the fund's auditor, attorneys, distribution agent, administrator, and investment managers. Fund boards must renegotiate these contracts with the various service providers each year. While consumers think of Fidelity funds as products offered by Fidelity, by law the shareholders in these funds are represented by their boards, which reselect Fidelity each year to manage the fund.
On certain occasions, boards have exercised their right to take the management contract away from the original fund sponsor. The boards of the Navalier Funds in 1997 and Yacktman Funds in 1998 failed to grant the management contract to the founders for whom the funds were named, although these resolutions were defeated in subsequent shareholder votes. In 2002, the directors of the 40-year old Japan Fund were not satisfied with various aspects of their relationship with the existing management company and proposed to the shareholders that they sever the existing ties and award the management contract to Fidelity and the servicing and distribution contracts to SEI. The shareholders supported the board's recommendation. 3 More recently, the trustees of two closed-end funds, Asia Tigers Fund and India Fund, ousted their advisor. 4 These unusual outcomes highlight the difference between mutual funds and financial products offered by depository institutions. While fund boards can change which firm produces and offers the fund, bank and credit union products are inexorably tied to the offering institution. Terminations are extremely rare events. In most cases, a board would indicate its dissatisfaction with a manager through the tone of its discussions with management, possibly through fee renegotiations or by the willingness to merge a fund into another. The decision to merge two funds does not necessarily require formal approval from the fund's shareholders. Under Rule 17a-8 of the SEC, the target fund needs to obtain approval of a majority of its shareholders only if the acquiring fund's advisory contract or fundamental investment policy is materially different from that of the acquired fund; if 12b-1 fees increase subsequent to the merger; or if outside directors of the target fund do not constitute a majority of the outside directors of the acquiring fund. In practice, these rules exempt shareholders from voting on in-complex (i.e., in-family) mergers where the boards of the target and acquirer generally are the same.
Yet even for mergers that must nominally be approved by shareholders, the merger proposal would not likely be advanced without the advice and consent of the board, as hostile proxy contests and takeovers are uncommon in the fund industry. Thus, fund mergers reflect board decision making.
Fund mergers: winners and losers
There are two types of fund mergers: in-family mergers that lead to a combination of two funds within the same family (or sponsor or complex), and across-family mergers that occur when the acquiring and target funds belong to different fund families. We study mergers during the 1999-2001 period using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Funds database. Aggregate deal activity (i.e., the sum of all target and acquiring fund assets) as a fraction of the size of the open-end mutual fund industry in '' CBS Market Watch, November 27, 2003 (visited via Factiva, 10/31/2004 . a given year is relatively modest: 2.22% and 0.72% for in-and across-family mergers, respectively. However, for families engaged in some merger activity, this phenomenon is more material. Measured as a fraction of the assets of the fund family engaged in a merger, the corresponding deal activity figures are 4.61% and 9.72%, respectively. These figures are reported in Table 1 , Panel A. Panel B provides a breakdown of merger activity across investment objectives. Deal activity, measured as a fraction of assets in the matched investment objective, points towards a higher level of in-family mergers for funds in the international bond and international equity categories.
From a corporate governance perspective, in-family and across-family fund mergers are quite different, and are treated separately in our analysis. Because most fund families have one board that oversees multiple funds in the fund complex, there tends to be significant overlap between the board members of target and acquiring funds of in-family mergers. In 1999, for example, the proportion of overlap is 85% (100%) for the average (median) fund in our sample. For in-family mergers, these same individuals might have fiduciary duties to both the target and the acquirer, and reconciling these responsibilities could be difficult. This potential conflict of fiduciary duties is absent for boards contemplating across-family mergers, where the target and acquiring funds' shareholders are represented separately. We therefore focus primarily on across-family mergers.
Our study examines whether certain types of boards are more likely to approve fund mergers in response to poor performance. This question is meaningful only if the mergers are in the interests of fund shareholders but not in the private interests of directors. Below, we motivate our work by showing that this conflict of interest is at work, at least for across-family mergers.
In brief, mergers generally benefit target shareholders. Prior research shows that fund mergers are often the result of poor performance (Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling, 2002; Zhao, 2005) . In our sample, this pattern is also observed. Table 2 , Panels A and B, and Fig. 1 show that target funds underperform and that mergers lead to substantial improvements in performance for target funds, whether measured using objective-adjusted returns or single-factor alphas. This improvement is greatest for in-family mergers, as their under performance tends to be more severe prior to the merger. After mergers, performance merely matches the category median.
The pattern of fund flows and fund size is consistent with the performance characteristics exhibited around the merger. Panels C and D of Table 2 show that target funds experience lower net asset flows and objective-adjusted net assets flows in the premerger period relative to acquiring funds. As a consequence of outflows and poor performance, target funds are substantially smaller than acquirer funds (Panel E).
While mergers arrest target funds' poor performance, the wealth implications for acquiring funds are less positive. Table 2 , Panels A and B, and the right-hand portion of Fig. 1 report the annual and cumulative returns experienced by shareholders of acquiring funds. From Table 2 , we see that acquiring firms do no better after mergers than before. Moreover, Panels F and G of Table 2 document a significant decline in post-merger expenses for the shareholders of the target fund, although not for the acquirer. This is consistent with the literature on corporate takeovers, which finds that targets reap substantial gains while acquirers experience negative or neutral outcomes (e.g., Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005) .
If target board members were also to benefit from fund mergers, then the decision to merge a poorly performing fund could be explained by their private interests, rather than Table 1 Distribution of mergers by year and investment objective Panel A reports the number of targets and acquirer funds by year, total target and acquirer fund net assets (TNA) in millions, and deal activity as a fraction of family/industry assets over the period 1999-2001. The information is reported separately for the sample of in-family and across-family targets and acquirers. Panel B reports the distribution of the merger sample by investment objective. The ''unknown'' objective category refers to fund mergers for which we are unable to obtain the fund objective from CRSP. In computing these figures, funds with multiple share classes are combined into a single observation. Total deal activity is the sum of all target and acquiring fund assets in a given year. Deal activity/family assets (deal activity/industry assets) is the total deal activity normalized by the size of the fund families engaged in the merger (size of the open-end fund industry). Deal activity/obj assets is the sum of all target and acquiring fund assets in a particular objective, normalized by the size of all open-end funds in the objective under consideration. Table 2 Characteristics of target and acquirer funds around fund mergers This table presents the median objective-adjusted return, single-factor alpha, net asset flow, objective-adjusted net asset flow, fund size, expenses, and objective-adjusted expenses for acquiring and target funds during the fouryear period surrounding the merger. The full sample includes all mergers during the 1999-2001 period. The objective-adjusted return is computed as the difference between a fund's annual return and the median return of all funds within the same objective. Objective-adjusted flows are computed in a similar manner. p-values report the significance of the difference in medians across the target and acquiring funds in the years preceding the merger, and over various event windows surrounding the merger. The following benchmarks are used in computing singlefactor alphas for the various investment objectives: aggressive (CRSP equally weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index), balanced (0.65*S&P 500 Index + 0.35*Solomon Brothers long-term, high-grade corporate bond index), corporate bond (Solomon Brothers long-term, high-grade corporate bond index), equity income (0.7* CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index + 0.3*Solomon Brothers long-term, high-grade corporate bond index), government bond (Lehman US aggregate government bond index), government mortgage (Solomon Brothers government mortgage index), growth (CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index), growth and income (CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index), international bond (Solomon Brothers world bond index), international equity (MSCI AC World Index), municipal bond (Lehman municipal bond), small cap (CRSP first decile index of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms), specialty environment (S&P 500 environment services index), specialty finance (S&P 500 Financials Index), specialty health (0.5*S&P 500 ES health care index + 0.5*S&P 500 pharmaceuticals index), specialty metal (S&P 500 gold index), specialty natural resources (0.5*S&P 500 ES energy index + 0.5* S&P 500 oil and gas index), specialty real estate (national REIT index), specialty technology (0.5*Goldman Sachs technology index + 0.5* S&P 500 ES technology index), and specialty utility (S&P 500 utility index).
p-values for changes Year relative to merger
Year relative to merger Equally weighted cumulative average net (objective-adjusted) performance for the target and acquiring funds for the three years preceding through one year subsequent to the merger. We report separate performance series based on the proportion of independent fund directors on the board: less than 75%, and equal to or greater than 75%. Separate figures for the full sample of targets, and in-family and across-family targets and acquirers are provided. IBD represents the percentage of independent board members. Panel B. Equally weighted cumulative average gross (objective-adjusted) performance for the target and acquiring funds for the three years preceding through one year subsequent to the merger. We report separate performance series based on the proportion of independent fund directors on the board: less than 75%, and equal to or greater than 75%. Figures for the full sample of targets, and in-family and across-family targets and acquirers are provided. IBD represents the percentage of independent board members.
A. Khorana et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 85 (2007) 571-598 by their fiduciary duties and the alignment of interests with shareholders. If mergers are costly to target fund directors, however, then the decision to merge could reflect good governance. Indeed, across-family mergers generate significant costs for target fund directors. In addition to bearing the sheer tedium of working through merger documents, target fund trustees seem to fare poorly from a financial perspective. We track trustees of funds that were merged out of existence and their subsequent trustee fees and other compensation received either (1) from the acquiring fund or (2) from elsewhere in the target or acquiring complex. Table 3 reports the annual compensation of independent board members and our estimates of the present value of annual compensation that directors would receive until retirement. To compute the present values, we assume a compensation growth rate of 6%, a discount rate of 10%, and a retirement age of 72 (a retirement practice followed by many fund families.) These figures are reported for both the targets and acquirers, before and after the fund merger, using compensation data from SEC filings. The 6% compensation growth rate assumption is based on average trustee annual compensation growth rates for the 1990s. (More recently, however, fund directors have been receiving 10-13% salary increases. See www.mfgovern.com.) The discount rate assumption of 10% reflects Brickley, Linck, and Coles' (1999) method for computing compensation for corporate directors. Compensation data are not available for the full sample: of the 669 target funds that were merged during the 1999-2001 period, we have board data for 614 funds, of which we are able to gather pre-and post-merger compensation data for 555 funds. In brief, trustees of target funds-especially those involved in across-family mergerslose board seats and compensation. Only 46% of any of the across-family target board's trustees continue to serve as trustees for any of the funds within the target or acquirer complex, suggesting that in 54% of the cases, not a single target fund director subsequently serves on the board of any fund in either the target or the acquirer family. Those 46% with continuing service in the complex lose median annual compensation of $1,897 between the pre-merger year and the post-merger year; the 54% with no continuing service lose median compensation of $18,000. Overall, trustees of funds acquired in across-family mergers each lose median compensation of $15,000 as a result of approving the merger of the funds they Table 3 Changes in director compensation surrounding the merger This table reports mean and median pre-merger total compensation and changes in individual board member compensation between the pre-merger year and the post-merger year, from the fund complex. Total annual compensation and the present value of annual compensation independent directors would receive until retirement, are reported separately for acquirer boards, in-family targets, and across-family targets. The present value of compensation until retirement is based on a growing annuity model using a 6% growth rate, a 10% discount rate, and a time period based on the number of years until the mandatory retirement age of 72 years. In computing annual compensation and the present value of compensation until retirement, we first measure the average compensation at the fund level and then compute mean (median) compensation across all funds in the sample. Continuing service refers to fund boards with at least one trustee continue to serve within the target or acquirer complex, while Discontinuing service means that not a single trustee continues service after the merger. oversee. The present value of the median annual loss in remuneration for directors terminated after an across-family merger is a more dramatic $112,132. By way of comparison, a small fraction (11%) of the target fund trustees engaged in in-family mergers lose all of their board seats after the merger. While infrequent, these wealth losses are comparable to those experienced by trustees engaged in across-family mergers. Table 3 also shows that acquiring boards enjoy higher compensation after mergers and that target boards of in-complex mergers tend to have small wealth consequences. These changes in compensation can partially explain why trustees of acquiring funds support mergers or why trustees of in-family target funds are indifferent to mergers. More puzzling is the fact that trustees who oversee across-family target funds suffer meaningful losses in compensation after the mergers. Supporting these mergers would seem contrary to the trustees' personal interests, yet they persist, apparently fulfilling their fiduciary duty to shareholders at their own expense. We therefore look to differences in governance structure to explain why these mergers might be approved by certain types of target fund boards.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
The dimensions of mutual fund governance
Our goal is to determine whether certain board structures and board characteristics-in particular those alleged to be better aligned with shareholder interests-help explain the likelihood of a poorly performing fund being merged out of existence. We examine a number of board structure variables as well as various controls.
Makeup of the fund's board. Consistent with the recent corporate finance and mutual fund literature, we hypothesize that board effectiveness is driven by the independence of its members. The SEC's proposed rule changes focus on the proportion of independent directors as a key measure of board independence, and require that a minimum of 75% of a board be independent. However, some funds were historically subject to considerably even stricter provisions. Section 3.2 of the Glass-Steagall Act effectively barred bank officers from holding seats on the boards of funds managed by subsidiaries of the bank. It did so by restricting bank personnel from serving as employees, directors, or officers of firms that were primarily engaged in the issuance, underwriting, or distribution of securities (Willis, 1995) . The Act effectively made bank-fund boards more independent than non-bank fund boards. In 1999, the Act was overturned and bank officers were free to sit on their funds' boards. While bank funds were no more restricted than other funds during our sample period, we keep track of bank funds separately, as they might have the legacy of an exogenously imposed independent board structure that non-bank funds would not. In our sample period, the median bank fund is composed of 80% independent directors, versus 75% for non-bank funds.
Independence of the fund's chair. The SEC has proposed that the chair of a fund board be an independent board member. In principle, the chair sets meeting agendas, directs the discussion, and sets the tone for a board, so an independent chair might enhance board independence and effectiveness. However, there has been a fierce debate over whether an independent chair is necessary or beneficial to shareholder interests, pitting fund leaders like Jack Bogle of Vanguard and Ned Johnson of Fidelity against one another. A. Khorana et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 85 (2007) Board size. Prior research has suggested that one measure of board effectiveness is board size, with larger boards hypothesized to be less effective due to problems associated with managing and coordinating the efforts of larger teams. For example, in the corporate finance literature, Yermack (1996) finds an inverse relation between board size and firm value. He also finds that smaller boards are more likely to initiate CEO dismissal following poor performance. Sevick (1997) and Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003) document that funds with smaller boards charge lower fees. In this spirit, we examine whether larger boards are less likely to approve performance-related mergers.
Director compensation. Higher compensation for directors could reflect greater skills and effectiveness, if compensation serves as a reward for better service as a fiduciary. However, lawsuits have alleged that high board compensation can lead to entrenchment. For example, Harford (2003) concludes that loss of directorship income leads outside directors to resist possible acquisitions that are in shareholders' interests. In the fund context, we might expect the highest-paid boards to be less likely to choose across-family mergers to remedy poor performance.
Number of outside directorships. Sitting on many boards can give a director valuable experience, which could improve the director's decision making. However, busier board members might not have enough time to carefully scrutinize various fund decisions. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) document that corporate boards with a majority of outside directors holding more than three board seats exhibit weaker corporate governance, manifested in lower firm profitability and lower sensitivity of top management turnover to firm performance. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) also show that CEO compensation is positively related to the percentage of independent board members who serve on three or more other boards. To specifically examine whether the inclusion of fund directors on other corporate and fund boards is beneficial or detrimental to board effectiveness, we compute the average number of outside directorships held by the fund's independent board members. When a fund director sits on multiple boards at another fund complex, we count it as a single outside directorship.
Industry expertise. Board members with a higher level of expertise might be more effective monitors. In an attempt to capture board members' experience and expertise, we collect data on (1) the proportion of outside fund directors who are also directors of another financial services firm (which could include a fund advisory firm, a money management firm, investment company, financial services company, investment bank, commercial bank, venture capital firm, financial consulting firm, or a real estate investment trust); (2) the proportion of outside directors who are currently or were formerly a part of the top management (CEO, president, chairman, or CFO) of another financial services firm; and (3) the fraction of outside fund directors who currently are or previously were part of the top management of any firm. We construct an aggregate measure of industry expertise by computing the proportion of outside directors who are or were directors or top managers of financial services firms.
Presence of retirement benefits and deferred compensation plans. Certain mutual funds offer retirement benefits to their outside directors. In addition, in certain instances fund directors have the option to defer their compensation. Potential target funds whose boards enjoy these long-term benefits not captured in current compensation might have disincentives to approve an across-family merger.
Director age. The relation between age, monitoring effectiveness, and incentives is unclear. Older directors bring more experience to bear, and given shorter likely board service expectations, have less to lose if they merge their fund out of existence. However, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) argue that older board members are less effective in their monitoring roles. We do not have clear predictions about how age might affect board effectiveness, but some of our tests include board member age as a control variable.
Other aspects of board structure could affect their effectiveness. However, because of the unavailability of data prior to 2002, we were unable to track information on director ownership, director tenure, and the presence of an independent nominating committee for the fund board.
Non-governance related factors affecting fund mergers
Fund mergers can be motivated by the desire to eliminate a poorly performing fund, with the performance effect stronger for in-family mergers. Across-family mergers are more complicated and can be instigated for strategic reasons, where fund families are attempting to realign the set of underlying product offerings via a merger. Hence, the impact of fund performance on merger likelihood could be a secondary rather than a primary motive for across-family mergers.
Fund flows could also be an important driver of the decision to undertake a fund merger. Sirri and Tufano (1998) document that the sensitivity of fund flows to performance is asymmetric, i.e., it is high during periods of superior performance but low during periods of underperformance. To the extent that outflows or slower inflows lead to higher operating costs and possibly higher fees for the fund shareholders, fund mergers can stem these losses. Hence, after taking fund performance into account, we suspect that a fund with lower asset inflows or higher outflows is more likely to be merged out of existence.
Another rationale for undertaking a merger is the desire to exploit economies of scale, and if so, mergers would be more likely for small and expensive funds.
We control for the number of investment objectives in the fund family as a proxy for family size and the extent of product diversification in the family. Larger fund families could be more sensitive to poor performance and more able to consolidate poorly performing funds through in-family mergers. Smaller fund families with fewer objectives are likely to exhibit dramatically different behavior, i.e., expanding the choice of product offerings by acquiring funds from outside the family. This behavior would be consistent with Khorana and Servaes (2006) who document that families with a higher degree of product differentiation have higher market share. This suggests a positive relation between the number of objectives in the family and the likelihood of in-family mergers, and a negative effect for across-family mergers.
Consistent with Zhao (2005) we include fund age as a control variable in our regressions. Fund families have motivations to merge younger underperforming funds. For example, because Morningstar requires funds to have a minimum of three years of history to be ranked, fund families can avoid a low ranking by terminating younger funds with poor performance.
3. The propensity to merge, post-merger performance, and governance structure
Data
As mentioned earlier, we use the CRSP Mutual Funds database as of 2002 to obtain monthly returns, expense ratios, loads, dollar values of fund assets under management, investment objectives, inception dates, and merger and liquidation dates (using the last_date variable in CRSP) for funds during the 1999-2001 period. Information to categorize bank versus non-bank funds is from COMPUSTAT. Data for funds with multiple share classes are combined using a value-weighted approach. Mergers occurring within share classes are excluded from the analysis. We spot checked approximately 20% of the CRSP merger dates for accuracy. The mean (median) difference between the merger date reported in the CRSP database and the merger filing date is 15 (9) days. Our tests treat the year of the merger as a separate period, so this inconsistency in merger reporting dates does not affect our results.
Information on the board structure and director compensation for the acquiring funds, target funds, and a matched sample of control funds (described below) is obtained from SEC Forms 485APOS and 485BPOS for mergers occurring during 1999-2001, with a filing date preceding and closest to the date of the merger. We collect the name of the trust to which the fund belongs, the number of funds that are a part of the trust, the size of the board (i.e., the number of people who sit on the board), the number of independent board members unaffiliated with the fund, the number of compensated board members, the name of each member of the board, the name of the board chair, and whether the chair is independent. In addition, we gather data on the total compensation received by board members from the fund, the trust the fund belongs to, and the fund complex. Funds with similar investment objectives within a fund family are typically placed in a trust. For instance, in 2000, Fidelity had 287 funds in 53 different trusts. When fund-level information is not available, the compensation of the entire trust is divided by the number of funds included in the trust, as a proxy for board compensation for the individual fund.
Additional variables include: (1) the presence/absence of a retirement plan and a deferred compensation plan for outside board members, (2) the number of other directorships outside of the fund family held by each independent board member, with a separate categorization to measure whether it is a financial services firm, (3) the presence/ absence of an outside board's member's top management experience in another firm, with a separate categorization to measure top management experience in a financial services firm, and (4) the age of each board member.
We use Morningstar data to supplement any missing data in the CRSP database. Data on industry assets are obtained from the Investment Company Institute, and data on detailed objective/sector returns are from Datastream.
Methodology and variable construction
To study the relation between the likelihood of a merger and underlying fund-specific factors, including various board-level characteristics, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression specification with three outcomes: (1) no merger, (2) an in-family merger, and (3) an across-family merger. For each target fund in the merger sample, we identify a randomly chosen objective-matched control fund that does not experience a merger during this period. In selecting the control fund, we exclude funds that experience a merger or liquidation during the two years prior to and subsequent to the merger observation. We also ensure that the control fund does not come from the same family as the target or acquiring fund.
The probability of a merger is estimated as a function of a number of fund characteristics (performance, fund size, asset flows, expense ratio, fund age), family/ complex characteristics (size of complex or number of objectives covered by funds in the complex), and fund governance characteristics (board size, proportion of independent directors, presence/absence of an independent chair, board compensation, number of outside directorships, board's industry expertise, presence of retirement benefits and deferred compensation plans, and director age). Performance (Perf) is the annual holdingperiod return of a fund in excess of the median return for all funds with the same investment objective, measured over the period from three years preceding to one year prior to the merger, and based on alphas obtained from both a single-factor and a multifactor model. 6 Fund Size is the log of total net assets for the fund. Asset Flows are the objective-adjusted net asset flows in a fund. Expense Ratio is the fund's expense ratio minus the median expense ratio for all funds with the same investment objective. Fund Age is the logarithm of fund age computed in years. Family Size is the log of total net assets managed by the complex. Family Objectives is the number of investment objectives in a family in the year of the merger.
Board size is the number of directors on the board of the fund. Compensation_fund (Compensation_fam) is the annual compensation earned by a board member from the fund (family). Independent Board (IBD) is the fraction of the board composed of independent directors who are considered to be unaffiliated with the fund. Independent Chair (ICH) is a dummy variable equal to one if the chair is classified as independent of the fund. Retirement is a dummy variable that equals one if the board members receive pension benefits from the fund after retirement, and zero otherwise. DeferComp is an indicator variable that equals one if the board members have the option to defer their compensation from the fund, and zero otherwise. Expert is a measure of the board's industry expertise, computed as the proportion of outside directors who are or were either directors or senior executives of a financial services firm. Directorship is the average number of directorships independent board members hold outside the fund family. Director Age is the average age of a fund's outside board members. Interaction effects are included to ascertain the marginal impact of board characteristics and fund performance. Finally, some specifications include a dummy variable for funds offered by banks, which might have had the legacy of independent boards as a result of the Glass-Steagall Act.
In theory, each fund can have a separate board, but in practice the same board members often oversee multiple funds within one complex. To account for the possibility that merger decisions within a complex are not necessarily independent, we estimate both multinomial and clustered logistic models. The clustered models take into account the possible lack of independence. For the sake of brevity, we report the results of the clustered models. Alphas based on a four-factor model are computed for the subsample of equity and bond funds. For equity funds, we use the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted index, the SMB and HML portfolios developed by Fama and French (1992) , and the momentum factor used by Carhart (1997) . For bond funds, we use the excess return on the Lehman Brothers government/corporate bond index, the excess return on the mortgage-backed securities index, the excess return on the long-term government bond index, and the excess return on the intermediate-term government bond index. These factor-model specifications are consistent with those in Blake, Elton, and Gruber (1993) .
Board characteristics
A. Khorana et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 85 (2007) 571-598 586 669 target funds engaged in a merger during the 1999-2001 period, we have board information for 614 funds corresponding with 516 acquirers. Using the criteria outlined in Section 3.2, we construct an objective-matched control sample of 574 funds, for which we have board information for 538 funds. We report separate univariates for the subsample of in-family and across-family targets and acquirers, along with t-tests for differences in means. Median values are not reported since they are equal to zero for some of the variables.
The average target board has 7.72 members versus 8.23 for acquirers. While 77% of the board members of the target funds are independent, acquiring funds have a slightly lower level of board independence (74%). While small, this difference between targets and acquirers is statistically significant. Boards of in-family targets are composed of 75% independent directors versus 79% for the across-family targets, and both exceed the minimum regulatory requirement of 50%.
We construct various measures of board compensation. Average compensation per board member from the fund (complex) equals $1,778 ($63,956) and $2,323 ($79,688) for the targets and acquirers, respectively. Directors at both target and control sample funds earn approximately the same total complex-level board fees, but less than acquirer board members. Note that the slight difference in compensation figures across Tables 3 and 4  arises because Table 3 requires post-merger compensation data.
Only 22% (25%) of the target (acquiring) funds have independent chairs. However, there are differences across the subsamples. Only 17% of the in-family acquirers have an independent chair compared with 46% of across-family acquirers. We similarly observe significantly large differences for the subsamples of in-family and across-family targets. The proportion of funds with an independent chair is 18% and 31%, respectively. Generally, boards approving across-family mergers have an independent chair more often than boards approving in-family mergers.
We also measure the past and current experience of a fund's board members as a possible proxy for expertise. For the average fund, an outside board member of an acrossfamily target fund sits on 1.15 other boards outside of the fund family under consideration, versus 1.39 boards for in-family targets, suggesting that directors engaged in across-family mergers have fewer outside responsibilities. Thirty-three percent of the outside directors of an in-family target serve as directors of another financial services firm with a corresponding figure of 37% for across-family targets. However, this difference is significant only at the 0.10 level. Hence, while across-family target boards hold fewer outside directorships-a potential indicator of less busy and more effective boards (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) a greater proportion of those directorships are held in financial services firms, allowing the board to gain relevant industry experience. However, there are no meaningful differences in the level of industry expertise or the age of the board members across various subsamples of target, acquirer, and control sample funds.
Target board characteristics and the tolerance of poor performance
In this section, we examine the central question posed in the paper: whether the composition of a fund's board is related to its tolerance for poor performance. Table 5 reports the findings of our multinomial logistic regression analysis. Panel A reports results of the basic models which include primary board-level characteristics (i.e., board size, proportion of independent fund directors, presence of an independent chair, and board Table 4 Board characteristics
This table provides mean descriptive statistics on various board level characteristics. Primary board characteristics include the size of the board, percentage of independent board members, board member compensation from the fund, total compensation received by the board member from the fund complex, and the proportion of instances where the chair of the fund's board is independent. Additional board characteristics (for independent board members) include the proportion of funds with retirement benefits, proportion of funds with the option to defer board member compensation, number of other directorships, the percentage of board members who serve on the board of another financial services firm, the percentage of board members who serve on the top management of another company, the percentage of board members who serve on the top management of another financial services firm, the percentage of board members with industry expertise which includes present or past directorship or top management experience in another financial services firm, and mean age of the directors. This information is provided for the sample of target funds, acquiring funds, and a non-target control sample. Our sample includes 614 target funds, 516 acquirers, and 538 control funds. member compensation) and the control variables. Panel B adds a dummy variable for whether the fund is offered by a bank, along with additional board characteristics such as the presence of retirement benefits and/or a deferred compensation plan for outside directors, and the industry expertise of the outside directors. Consistent with previous research, we find a negative, statistically significant, and material relation between fund performance and the likelihood of a merger. Based on Model II of Panel A (excluding the interaction terms), a decrease in fund performance by one standard deviation from the mean, with all other variables at their mean level, increases the likelihood of an in-family (across-family) merger by 31% (24%). To provide some perspective on these numbers, the base case probabilities of an in-family and acrossfamily merger are 31% and 14%, respectively.
We observe a positive and statistically significant relation between fund expenses and the likelihood of a merger, attributable to in-family mergers. We also find a negative relation between fund size and merger likelihoods. Smaller and more expensive funds are more likely to be combined with other funds within the family, perhaps to take advantage of economies of scale. In addition, older funds-which due to survivorship considerations are better established funds-are less likely to be merged out of existence. While the coefficient on fund age is negative for both subsamples, it is significant only for across-family mergers. This result is not the artifact of incubated funds being merged out of existence. Our tests require that a fund have three years of historical data to establish prior performance, and this would largely eliminate incubated funds from our analysis. The median fund in our sample is seven years old.
Families with a larger number of investment objectives are more likely to engage in an in-family merger. These findings are consistent with Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) who posit that these more diverse, and presumably larger, families are better able to eliminate poorly performing funds through in-family mergers.
In terms of board characteristics, Panel A of Table 5 shows that the percentage of independent board members for the target fund (the IBD variable) has a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a merger, independent of the performance of the fund. These effects are only observed for across-family mergers. The economic significance of this coefficient is substantial: a one standard deviation increase in the independent board percentage increases the likelihood of an across-family merger by 40%. When we include the bank dummy in Panel B, the parameter estimate for the percentage of independent board members remains positive, but drops in significance below conventional levels. However, the bank-fund dummy itself is significant. While bank funds tend to have more independent boards, the unconditional merger likelihood is more related to their bank status than to their board composition.
Our predictions do not relate board structure to mergers per se, but rather seek to understand the likelihood of a merger conditional on fund performance. Table 5 analyzes interaction terms between performance and board structure to determine whether the characteristics of independent boards accentuate the impact of performance on merger likelihood. To explicitly examine the effectiveness of the recent SEC mandate requiring more than 75% independent directors, we interact fund performance with an independent board dummy (Performance*IBD75) that is assigned a value of one for boards with at least 75% independent directors, and zero otherwise. In other specifications, we interact fund performance with a dummy that equals one for boards where 100% of the directors are independent (Performance*IBD100) to examine the effectiveness of wholly independent boards in initiating fund mergers.
The results reported in Model I (Panels A and B) indicate that fund boards where at least 75% of the directors are independent do not exhibit a different tolerance of poor performance than do boards with less than 75% independent directors. Fund boards where all of the directors are independent, however, tolerate significantly less underperformance before initiating a merger, although this result is observed only for the sample of across-family targets. The Performance*IBD100 interaction term is negative and statistically significant in Models II and IV (Panels A and B). This result persists even after adding the bank-fund dummy. The economic significance of a completely independent board in terms of its tolerance of poor performance is also large: it results in a 13% increase in the likelihood of a merger. Hence, a wholly independent board seems associated with greater sensitivity to fund performance, and with respect to mergers, the SEC rule mandating 75% independents might not have as substantial an impact as one that requires 100% independents.
The recent SEC rule mandates that funds have independent chairs, but our data provide no evidence of a relation between independent chairs and the likelihood of a merger. For both in-family and across-family mergers, the coefficient on the independent chair dummy is insignificant. Also, the interaction term that captures the marginal impact of performance on merger likelihood conditional on an independent chair (Performance*ICH) is not significant. This suggests that boards with independent chairs are no more sensitive to performance before initiating a merger than are boards with non-independent chairs. Board size is also not reliably related to the likelihood of a merger.
We do find that board compensation is related to the likelihood of certain mergers occurring. In some specifications, compensation per board member for the directors of the target funds (Compensation_fund variable) is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of an across-family merger, after controlling for the effect of family size. However, no such effect is observed for the subsample of in-family mergers. In a simplified model without any interaction terms based on Model II of Panel A, increasing average fund compensation of the target fund board members by one standard deviation decreases the likelihood of an across-family merger by 36%. In an across-family merger, target independent directors are more likely to lose their board seats and hence their compensation-which could understandably make them more reluctant to support this type of merger. This effect is weak at best for in-family mergers, where the closure of a fund does not meaningfully affect a director's total compensation. In Model IV of Panels A and B, we substitute the board member compensation received from the fund (Compensation_fund variable) with compensation received from the entire family (Compensation_fam variable) and find that our previous results become even stronger. The decrease in the likelihood of an across-family merger when complex compensation is increased by one standard deviation above the mean (using the coefficients in Model IV of Panel A excluding the interaction terms) is 47%. In additional models not reported for the sake of brevity, we employ the present value of the annuity for compensation received by a board member from the entire family, assuming a retirement age of 72 years, a compensation growth rate of 6%, and a discount rate of 10%. Similar to the results reported above, we find a strong inverse relation between the annuitized value of compensation and the likelihood of an across-family merger.
To shed additional light on the economic importance of the relation between board independence, fund performance, and the likelihood of the merger, we compute merger probabilities for different levels of board independence and fund performance. Holding the Table 5 The determinants of a fund merger: multinomial logistic results
This table reports the results of multinomial logistic regressions examining the determinants of the fund merger decision. All models are clustered at the family level to control for the possible lack of independence in merger decisions within a fund family. Performance (Perf) is the average annual holding-period return of the fund in excess of the median return for all funds in the matched investment objective, in the three years (À3, À1) preceding the merger. Fund Size is the logarithm of total net assets in the fund. Asset Flows are the objective-adjusted net asset flows into the fund in the year preceding the merger. Expense Ratio is the total expense ratio of a fund and is also measured on an objective-adjusted basis. Fund age is the logarithm of fund age computed in years. Family Objectives is total number of objectives in the target fund's family. Family Size is the logarithm of total net assets in the family. Board Size is total number of members on the board of the target fund. Compensation_fund (Compensation_fam) is the average fund compensation received by a board member over the course of one year from the fund (family). IBD (Independent Board %) is the percentage of board members who are considered to be unaffiliated with the fund, i.e., independent directors. ICH (Independent Chair) is a dummy variable that equals one if the chair is independent/unaffiliated with the fund, and zero otherwise. The Independent Board Dummy-IBD75 and IBD100-is an indicator variable that equals one if the percentage of independent directors is greater or equal to 75%/100%, and zero otherwise. The Bank Dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund is a bank fund and zero otherwise. Retirement is a dummy variable that equals one if the independent boards of directors receive pension benefits from the fund after retirement, and zero otherwise. DeferComp is an indicator variable that equals one if the independent boards of directors have the option to defer their compensation from the fund, and zero otherwise. Expert is the percentage of independent directors with industry expertise, computed as the proportion of outside directors who currently are or previously were either directors or part of the top management of a financial services firm. Results of multinomial logistic regression are separately reported for in-family and across-family mergers, compared against a control group of funds that did not experience a merger. P-values are reported in parentheses. percent of independent board members at a predetermined level in a simple logistic regression (which mimics Model II of Panel A, excluding all interaction terms), and using the mean values for the independent variables, we separately compute the probability of a fund being merged in family and across family by altering fund performance based on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of the distribution. These relations are plotted in Fig. 2 . For a given level of underperformance, funds with a greater proportion of independent directors are more likely to be merged out of existence, but this result is most pronounced for across-family mergers, graphically demonstrating the economic magnitude of the observed relation among performance, board independence, and merger likelihood. Panel B of Table 5 examines the importance of additional board characteristics such as the existence of retirement benefits, deferred compensation plans, and industry expertise. It also shows the interaction effects between these variables and fund performance to ascertain if certain board characteristics alter the board's tolerance of underperformance. We do not find any of these variables to be significant in our multivariate analysis. In additional unreported models, we include the number of outside directorships held by the fund's independent board members and the average director age, but do not find any significant results. Hence, we cannot offer much evidence that these board characteristics are related to the observable decision to merge a fund-especially a poorly performing fund-out of existence.
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on the likelihood of a fund becoming a target as a result of various fund characteristics. Acquirer fund shareholders do not gain tremendously from mergers, but board members might, so there are few sharp predictions about how acquirer board structure might affect merger likelihoods. In unreported models, we also examine the relation between the characteristics of acquirer boards and the likelihood of their participation in a merger, after controlling for the same set of fund-and family-level variables used to examine the target fund boards. Most of the variables are not significant, suggesting that we have little ability to predict likely acquirers. We find no relation between acquiring fund board characteristics and merger likelihoods for the infamily sample, with two exceptions: highly compensated fund boards are less likely to engage in across-family acquisitions, and funds with independent chairs are more likely to engage in across-family acquisitions.
Robustness tests and caveats
We conduct additional tests to check the robustness of our results. First, we redo all our multivariate tests using single-factor and multi-factor performance measures instead of objective-adjusted returns. Even though we lose some observations, the economic and statistical significance of our board-level, fund -level, and family-level variables remain unchanged. Second, we reestimate our models after excluding money market funds from the sample, because money market fund mergers could be motivated by a different mix of factors, e.g., more by cost than by performance considerations. We find no change in our overall findings. Third, we estimate the various regression models on a year-by-year basis to see if the results are robust across the various years in our sample. Our findings are generally consistent with the full sample results; however, given the smaller sample size in these regressions, the significance of some of the coefficients is somewhat lower.
In interpreting this or any other cross-sectional analysis, there naturally are unanswered questions surrounding causality. In our context, it is useful to explain how fund boards come to be selected. Once a fund is in operation, the independent members of the existing board typically form a nominating committee to select new members of that board. However, management companies can strongly influence the initial composition of a board. When a new fund is set up, it often has a single shareholder (sometimes an attorney working for the fund complex) who elects the initial board. This initial board is likely to be either (1) the same board that oversees other funds in the complex or (2) Table 5 (excluding all interaction terms), and using the mean values for the independent variables (except performance), we compute the merger probability by altering fund performance from three years preceding to one year prior to the merger, based on the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th percentile of the distribution. IBD represents the percentage of independent board members.
of individuals selected by the management company. Fund sponsors can therefore select initial board members who will act with greater or lesser independence, although the development of the actual board over time would not be so tightly controlled by the fund sponsor. The essence of the causality problem in our study is that a fund sponsor more sensitive to its fiduciary duties could select a like-minded and more independent board, and both would tend to support actions that are more pro-shareholder. A relation between board structures and various shareholder outcomes could merely reflect these underlying common attitudes without implying a direct relation between board structure and fund performance. This alternative hypothesis is difficult to test in a cross-sectional analysis. The recent requirement that boards have at least 75% independent members and an independent chair could produce an interesting experiment that will force exogenous change in the industry, and will be ripe for study within a few years.
Post-merger performance
Up to this point, we have focused on the relation between board characteristics and the likelihood of a merger in response to poor fund performance. We also analyze whether there is a relation between board structure and post-merger fund performance. The corporate finance literature suggests that independent outside directors enhance target shareholder gains from tender offers, and more independent boards are more likely to use resistance strategies to enhance shareholder wealth (Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997) .
In Fig. 1 we look at the changes in objective-adjusted fund returns surrounding the merger and compare them with the extent of pre-merger underperformance for target fund subgroups constructed based on the level of board independence. Panels A and B of Fig. 1 illustrate the cumulative average net and gross performance over the three years preceding and one year subsequent to the merger. The pictures tell a relatively simple story: targets with less independent boards underperform more significantly prior to merger, but postmerger, this underperformance is eliminated. This is not to say the funds outperform after they merge; rather, they simply stop underperforming. Furthermore, the cumulative underperformance experienced by the less independent boards is not reversed; rather, it is a permanent loss suffered by long-term shareholders.
More formally, we explicitly test whether the objective-adjusted fund returns in the postmerger year are statistically different between boards with less than and more than 75% independent members, but find no evidence to suggest that this is the case (p-value ¼ 0.57). Furthermore, we compare the performance of our funds with the objective-matched control sample. The difference in performance across these two samples, analyzed separately for our two subgroups, is statistically indistinguishable from zero, again suggesting that all funds irrespective of board characteristics experience similar post-merger performance. For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported in a table. In essence, once a merger occurs, a fund's performance tends to revert to the mean of its group. Less independent boards might be slower to act, but once they do, their funds' subsequent performance is indistinguishable from the performance of target funds with more independent boards.
Conclusion
Mutual fund boards, especially their independent members, are charged with specific responsibilities to protect the interests of fund shareholders. They oversee fund pricing, ensure regulatory compliance, and renegotiate contracts each year with all the service providers, including the management company, distributor, auditor, and others. They also play an integral role in the merger process. Given the many recent allegations about the ineffectiveness of fund boards, we examine whether board independence, measured in a variety of ways, influences the likelihood and outcome of fund mergers. As in other papers, we find that fund mergers occur when a target is smaller, underperforms its peers, and experiences asset outflows. Specifically, we try to understand whether board structure influences the relation between performance and the likelihood of a fund merger.
Our results suggest that board structure matters-up to a point. We find no evidence that smaller boards and boards with independent chairs are more responsive to shareholder interests, at least with respect to in-family or across-family fund mergers. However, we do find that target boards with a larger fraction of independent directors are less willing to tolerate poor performance before initiating mergers. While current rules mandate that boards be composed of at least 75% independent members, we find that it is boards composed of only independent members (100% independent) that are intolerant of poor performance. These results are observable only for the subsample of across-family mergers where, unlike in-family mergers, the target and acquiring fund boards do not have any significant overlap in fund directors. For boards of funds engaged in in-family mergers, reconciling their separate fiduciary duties to target and acquiring funds can be relatively difficult.
Target fund boards approve across-family mergers even when this leads to a substantial loss in their compensation, consistent with trustees putting the interests of shareholders before their own. But in our multinomial logistic regression analyses, across-family mergers are less likely among target funds whose directors are paid more, especially because these trustees are likely to lose their seats and compensation as a result of the merger. This suggests that directors' private interests may come into conflict with their fiduciary duties.
While some pundits have characterized fund boards as sleeping dogs rather than watchdogs, once awakened, these dogs bark and bite similarly. Post-merger, regardless of prior board makeup, target funds stop underperforming, bringing their performance roughly up to the median level of funds with the same investment objective.
Some have suggested that fund boards are an unnecessary anachronism. In a world where investors can get updated information each day on the performance of their funds, and can vote with their feet, why do we need boards? Our work suggests that mergerswhich shareholders cannot initiate on their own-are more quickly triggered by certain types of boards. Because these mergers stem performance deterioration, perhaps we should be careful before removing this layer of investor protection.
